“A man should hear a little music, read a little poetry, and see a fine picture every day of his life, in order that worldly cares may not obliterate the sense of the beautiful which God has implanted in the human soul.”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
The Wholeness of Nature: Goethe´s Way of Science
Author: Henri Bortoft
Part I -- Authentic and Counterfeit Wholes
I distinguish authentic wholeness from counterfeit forms in terms of the relationship between whole and part. (...) page 3
True interpretation is actively receptive, not assertive in the sense of dominating what is read. True interpretation does not force the text into the mold of the reader´s personality, or into the requirements of this previous knowledge. It conveys the meaning of the text -"conveys" in the sense of "passes through" or "goes between". This is why readers sometimes can convey to others more of the meaning of a text than they may understand themselves. (Page 7)
Indeed, we can sometimes find that it is just the understanding of a single passage which suddenly illuminates for us the whole meaning of the text. (Page 8)
The hermeneutic circle (...) developed by Schleiermacher in his program for general hermeneutics as the art of understanding. (Page 8)
The reciprocal relationship of part and whole which is revealed here shows us clearly that the act of understanding is not a logical act of reasoning, because such an act depends on the choice of either/or. The paradox arises from the tacit assumption of linearity- implicit in the logic of reason- which supposes that we must go either from part to whole or from whole to part. Logic is analytical, whereas meaning is evidently holistic, and hence understanding cannot be reduced to logic. (...) It is because meaning is encountered in this "circle" of the reciprocal relationship of the whole and the parts that we call it the hermeneutic circle. (Page 9-- so if we need a different capacity other than logic to reach understanding, how can we nurture it?)
This approach effectively considers the whole as if it were a part, but a "super part" which controls and dominates the other, lesser parts. It is not the true whole, and neither can the parts be true parts when they are dominated by this counterfeit whole. (Page 10)
But, at the same time, to assert the primacy of the whole is not to maintain that it is dominant, in the sense of having an external superiority over the parts. (Page 10)
We can see the limitations of these two extreme approaches to the whole if we look at the act of writing. We put marks for words together on a page by the movement of the pen to try to say something. What is said is not the resultant sum of the marks, nor of the words which they indicate. What is said is not the resultant sum of the marks, nor of the words which they indicate. What is said is not produced automatically by the words adding together as they come. But equally, we do not have what is sod fixed and finished in front of us before it is written. (Page 10)
The hazard of emergence is such that the whole depends on the parts to be able to come forth, and the parts depend on the coming forth of the whole to be significant instead of superficial. (Page 11)
We do not have part and whole, though the number category of ordinary language will always make it seem so. If we do separate part and whole into two, we appear to have an alternative of moving in a single direction, either from part to whole or from whole to part. If we start from this position, we must at least insist on moving in both directions at once, so that we have neither the resultant whole as a sum nor the transcendental whole as a dominant authority, but the emergent whole which comes forth into the parts. (Page 11)
Rather, a part is special and not accidental, since it must be such as to let the whole come into presence. This specialty of the part is particularly important because it shows us the way to the whole. It clearly indicates that the way to the whole is into and through the parts. (Page 12)
This dual movement, into the whole through the parts, is demonstrated clearly in the experience of speaking and reading, listening and writing. (Poetry??? page 12)
Psychologists have discovered that there are two major modes of organization for a human being: the action mode and the receptive mode. In the early infant state, we are in the receptive mode, but this is gradually dominated by the development of the action mode of organization that is formed in us by our interaction with the physical environment. (Page15-16)
The internalization of this experience of manipulating physical bodies gives us the object-based logic which Henri Bergson called "the logic of solids"- (page16)
This kind of consciousness is institutionalized by the structure of our language, which favors the active mode of organization. As a result we are well prepared to perceive selectively only some of the possible features of experience. (Page 16)
The alternative mode of organization, the receptive mode, is one which allows events to happen -for example, the play above. Instead of being verbal, analytical, sequential, and logical, this mode of consciousness is nonverbal, holistic, nonlinear and intuitive. It emphasizes the sensory and perceptual instead of the rational categories of the action mode. It is based on taking in, rather than manipulating, the environment. (Page 16)
For reasons of biological survival, the analytic mode has become dominant in human experience. (Page 16)
Kant´s "appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer questions which he has himself formulated" Science believes itself to be objective, but is in essence subjective because the witness is compelled to answer questions which the scientist himself has formulated. (Page 17)
This distinction has been made into the basis for a dualism in which only the primary qualities are considered to be real. (Page 17)
The reality of nature is not identical to the appearances which our senses give, and a major aim of positivist science is to replace the phenomenon with a mathematical model which can incorporate only the primary qualities. (Page 18)
There is little wonder that the successful development of physics has led to an ever-increasing alienation of the universe of physics from the world of our everyday experience. (Page 18-does this happen with SSc? is it losing its people?)
Goethe attempted to develop a physics of color which was based on everyday experience. He worked to achieve an authentic wholeness by dwelling in the phenomenon instead of replacing it with a mathematical representation. (Page 19)
For Goethe they came into being out of a relationship between light and darkness. (page 20-on the difference of understandings between Goethe and Newton’s way to color)
In other words Goethe´s presentation describes the origin of colors whereas Newton´s does not. (page 19)
Goethe´s method was to extend and deepen his experience of the phenomenon until he reached that element of the phenomenon which is not given externally to sense experience. This is the connection or relationship in the phenomenon which he called the law (Gesetz), and which he found by going more deeply into the phenomenon instead of standing back from it or trying to go beyond it intellectually to something which could not be experienced. (page 21)
It is perceived by an intuitive experience-what Goethe called Anschauung, which "may be held to signify the intuitive knowledge gained through contemplation of the visible aspect" (page 21)
“To think is easy. To act is hard. But the hardest thing in the world is to act in accordance with your thinking.”
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
In following Goethe´s approach to scientific knowledge, one finds that the wholeness of the phenomenon is intensive. (page 21)
It is perceived through the mind, when the mind functions as an organ of perception instead of the medium of logical thought. (page 21)
As Cassirer said, "The mathematical formula strives to make the phenomena calculable, that of Goethe to make them visible." (page 21)
He was especially scathing towards the kind of theory which attempted to explain the phenomenon by some kind of hidden mechanism. (page 21)
Goethe´s way of thinking is concrete, not abstract, and can be described as one of dwelling in the phenomenon. (page 22)
The primal phenomenon is not to be thought of as a generalization from observations produced by abstracting from different instances something that is common to them. (page 22)
For Goethe, the primal phenomenon was a concrete instance -what he called "an instance worth a thousand, bearing all within itself". In a moment of intuitive perception, the universal is seen within the particular, so that the particular instance is seen as a living manifestation of the universal. (page 22)
In terms of the category of wholeness, the primal phenomenon is an example of the whole which is present in the part. (page 22)
Working with mental images activates a different mode of consciousness which is holistic and intuitive. One area where this style of learning is now used practically is in transpersonal education. Experiments with guided imagination indicate that a frequent result is the extension of feelings, whereby the student experiences a deeper, more direct contact with the phenomenon imagined. In this way, a more comprehensive and complete encounter with the phenomenon results, and aspects of the phenomenon otherwise unnoticed often come to light. In addition, students feel themselves to be more in harmony with the phenomenon, as if they themselves were participating in it. This leads to an attitude toward nature more grounded in concern, respect, and responsibility. (page 22---can this be happening in Colombia?)
Phenomenology brings to light what is hidden at first. (page 26)
Part II -- Goethe´s Scientific Consciousness
Contemporary problems, many arising from modern scientific method, confront people with the fact that they have become divorced from a realistic appreciation of their place in the larger world. (page 26--is this relevant to understand the project in Colombia?)
It has been widely believed that science advances by the use of its own internal method for attaining the truth, so that scientific knowledge is legitimated by its own authority. However, it turns out that there is no such method, and science is best understood as a culturally based activity, i.e. as the product of a social process. (page 31)
This has been borne out, for example, in studies of the seventeenth-century scientific revolution, where it has been shown that the success of the mechanical philosophy was due as much to eternal political and religious reasons as to its having been shown to be true by any internal scientific method. (page 31--then for SSc if it continues to advance as a science but doesn’t pay attention to the social process part... can it ever achieve its ideals?)
It is often those who are primarily interested in Goethe as a poet who have the greatest difficulty integrating his scientific work into their perspective. (page 32)
"After what I have seen of plants and fishes in the region of Naples, in Sicily, I should be sorely tempted, if I were ten years younger, to make a journey to India -not for the purpose of discovering something new, but in order to view in my way what has been discovered." Goethe was indicating here that the discovery of new facts was of secondary importance to him. What mattered was the way of seeing, which influenced all the facts. (page 33)
“A person hears only what they understand.”
― Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
Goethe referred to this discipline as "recreating in the wake of ever-creating nature.” Combined with active seeing, it has the effect of giving thinking more the quality of perception and sensory observation more the quality of thinking. (Page 42)
If we want to understand what scientific knowledge is, we have to learn to recognize the extra no sensory factor which transforms sensory experience into cognitive perception. This means learning to recognize the fundamental incoherence of empiricism as a philosophy of science. (Page 50)
The fundamental discovery on which phenomenology is bases is that consciousness has the structure of intentionality –it would be better to say that consciousness is intentionality. This is often expressed by saying that consciousness is always "conscious of”. In other words, consciousness is always directed towards an object. (Page 54)
Discovery in science is always the perception of meaning, and it could not be otherwise. (Page 57)
Since the time of Kant’s philosophy there has been a growing recognition of this active role of the mind, and of the tendency to mistake our won intellectual constructs for “the way things are”. (Page 57-58)
For example, Einstein said: the object of all sciences is to coordinate our experiences and bring them into a logical system”; and Neils Bohr said: “the task of science is both to extend the range of our experience and to reduce it to order”. (Page 58)
He came to see the wholeness of the phenomenon by consciously experiencing it, and this experience cannot be reduced to an intellectual construction in terms of which the phenomenon is organized. It is not reached by a process of intellectual thought, but by a change of consciousness. (Page 59)
There is now a growing body of evidence to support the view that there are two major modes of human consciousness which are complementary. In our technical-scientific culture we have specialized in the development of only one of these modes, to which our educational system is geared almost exclusively. This is the analytical mode of consciousness, which develops in conjunction with our experience of perceiving and manipulating solid bodies. The internalization of our experience of the closed boundaries of such bodies leads to a way of thinking which naturally emphasizes distinction and separation (page 61)
Henri Bergson noticed the affinity between logical relations with concepts and spatial relations with solid bodies, and he concluded that "our logic hardly does more than express the most general relations among solids” (page 61)
Often what is called the stream of thought is in fact the stream of language, and the process of thinking is none other than the flow of linguistic associations. The analytical mode of consciousness, therefore, corresponds to the discursive thought of what, for completeness, should be called the verbal-intellectual mind. (Page 63)
The holistic mode of consciousness is complementary to this analytical one. By contrast this mode is nonlinear, simultaneous, intuitive instead of verbal-intellectual, and concerned more with relationships than with the discrete elements that are related. It is important to realize that this mode of consciousness is a way of seeing, and as such it can only be experienced in its own terms. (Page 63)
The experience of a relationship as such is only possible through a transformation from a piecemeal way of thought to a simultaneous perception of the whole. Such a transformation amounts to a restructuring of consciousness itself. (Page 63)
It is important to realize that this is not a change in the content of consciousness, as if there were some element which previously had been overlooked, but a change in the mode of consciousness. This means that the change is in the relationship between the elements, i.e., in their mode of togetherness. (Page 64)
It is this process which contemplative meditation reverses by reinvesting attention in the sensory experience, and thus withdrawing it from the mental abstraction. (Page 65)
For this reason, Deikman identifies meditation as an exercise of the attention for producing deautomatization of the psychological structures organizing experience, especially the logical organization of consciousness. (Page 65)
In the description of Goethe´s work on color, in “The primal Phenomenon of Color”, we distinguished two stages in the encounter with the phenomenon. First there is the observation stage, which is characterized by active seeing instead of the passive reception of visual impressions. (Page 66)
The second stage in Goethe´s way, the stage he called exact sensorial imagination, takes this process further. It deepens both the encounter with the phenomenon and the process of deautomatization. The attempt to think the phenomenon in imagination, and not to think about it, is sensory and not intellectual, concrete not abstract. Attention is thereby further withdrawn from verbal associations and intellectual reasoning. This, therefore, is a deautomatization exercise. But at the same time it is an exercise in trying to see the phenomenon in the simultaneous mode, i.e., all at once. Hence, as well as undoing the usual construction of consciousness by the redirection of attention –which by itself can be sufficient for the other mode of consciousness to emerge- this exercise actively promotes the restructuring of consciousness into an organ of holistic perception. (Page 66)
A striking feature of this attempt to give attention to active looking and exact sensorial imagination is how much subjective resistance it can setup in a person. (Page 67)
This subjective effect is an instance of the psychological inertia which has to be matched by a person’s own activity if the state of his or her awareness is to change, just as the inertia of a material body has to be matched by a force if its state of motion is to be changed. (Page 67)
When consciousness is thus restructured into an organ of holistic perception, the mind functions intuitively instead intellectually. (page 67)
There is a lot of confusion and misunderstanding about intuition, as if it were something intangible and mysterious. But in fact it is a very clear and precise notion. Ornstein defines intuition as “knowledge without recourse to inference”. He links it with a simultaneous perception of the whole, whereas the logical or rational mode of knowledge “involves an analysis into discrete elements sequentially (inferentially) linked. (page 67) (SSc is about seeing systems, understanding relationships, knowing the whole… so this would motivate them to cultivate this mode of consciousness???)
Thus, intuition is connected with a change of consciousness, and moreover in a way which can be made quite precise and not just left vague. (page 67)
The difference is that, whereas the verbal-intellectual mind withdraws from the sensory aspect of the phenomenon into abstraction and generality, the intuitive mind goes into and through the sensory surface of the phenomenon to perceive it in its own depth. (page 68)
Etymologically “intuition” means “seeing into”, which clearly expresses the fact that it is the experience of seeing the phenomenon in depth. (page 68)
It was said then that there is no intellectual equivalent to this experience, and the reason for this is now clearly because it is an intuitive experience which depends on a change of consciousness. (page 68) (therefore the aim is not to replace traditional science but to enrich it)
When the phenomenon is seen intuitively, it has a further dimension to it, but this does not change the particular elements in the phenomenon. It changes the way that the elements are related, and hence their significance, but they remain the same elements so far as the senses are concerned. (page 68)
This dimension of the phenomenon is not seen by the senses, and not by the sightless fancies of the verbal-intellectual mind. It is seen intuitively by a change of consciousness. But it has to be remembered all the time that, when this dimension of the phenomenon is seen, the elements are the same as in the sensory phenomenon –the difference is in the way that they are related. It is the transformation in their mode of togetherness, which is experienced intuitively though a change of consciousness, that gives the phenomenon its intensive depth. (page 71)
It could therefore be said that in knowing the phenomenon, Goethe dwells within it consciously instead of replacing it with mental constructs –although equally it could be aid that the phenomenon itself dwells in Goethe´s scientific consciousness. (page 73)
Nonverbal meaning can only be perceived intuitively and not intellectually. (page 74)
So it could therefore be said that Goethe learned to read the language of color. (page 74-75)
In view of this, Goethe´s intuitive way of science can be recognized as a concrete illustration of Gadamer´s principle of universal hermeneutics that “being that can be understood is language”. (page 75)
“I love those who yearn for the impossible.”
― Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
“The mathematical formula strives to make the phenomena calculable, that of Goethe to make them visible.” (Page 75)
Linnaeus therefore imposed an organization on the plant so that each specimen had a place in a system, whereas Goethe let the plant speak for itself. (Page 81) (What about communities/systems are we also just looking to organize them rather than understand them?)
For Aristotle, one of the conditions for something to count as being known is that what is known must be the case of necessity; it is not possible for it to be otherwise. (Page 104) (entonces esto va de la mano con el comentario anterior, es necesario no solo analizar un sistema social sino conocerlo holísticamente, hasta que veamos las conexiones , el porque de las cosas, su necesidad, solo entonces seremos como decía Goethe “worthy of participating in the processes of nature” tal vez entonces podemos guiar un cambio?)
Consequently, scientific knowledge is not knowledge of what happens to be true –since this would not be “knowledge” for Aristotle- but of what cannot be otherwise and hence must be true. (Page 104)
This remains an intellectual abstraction. Goethe´s approach to science, through the holistic mode of consciousness, could therefore provide the intuitive experience of necessity which would complement what can be achieved by means of argument. (Page 105) (como se veria reflejado esto en cuestiones sociales?)
We (traditional science) consider knowledge to be a subjective state of the knower, a modification of consciousness which in no way affects the phenomenon that is known, this being the same whether it is known or not. Goethe, on the other hand, saw the knowledge of the phenomenon as being intimately related to the phenomenon itself, because for him the state of “being known” was to be understood as a further stage of the phenomenon itself. It is the stage which the phenomenon reaches in human consciousness. (page 108) (then if part of the phenomenon is to be known, by not incorporating the knowledge of children about the social system we are neglecting to know the actual system?)
Consequently the knower is not an onlooker but a participant in nature´s processes, which now act in consciousness to produce the phenomenon consciously as they act externally to produce it materially. (page 108)
This is the meaning of Goethe´s remark that the aim of science should be that “through the contemplation of an ever creating nature, we should make ourselves worthy of spiritual participation in her productions”. (page 108)
When consciousness is properly prepared, it becomes the medium in which the phenomenon itself comes into presence. (page 109) (so then also by changing the consciousness the phenomenon would come into presence in a different way???)
When the phenomenon becomes its own theory, this is a higher stage of the phenomenon itself. Evidently this does not apply to the kind of theory which is and intellectual framework imposed on the phenomenon by the mind. (page 109) (what does this say about frameworks then??)
We do have an impression of ourselves as being separate and independent from the world, detached from nature, which puts us in the position of being onlookers. (page 111)
It is this sense of separation that gives us the attitude which is necessary to be able to treat the world as an object to be operated on, manipulated, and organized. (page 111) (meaning without this attitude frameworks would not work???)
Subject and object are born together, so that a change in the mode of one necessarily entails a change in the mode of the other. (page 111)
Owen Barfield: They (primal phenomenon) come into existence as types, or laws, only as they are intuited by human beings. And until they have so come into being, the object itself is incomplete. Knowledge in fact, so far from being a mental copy of events and processes outside the human being, inserts the human being right into those processes, of whose development it is itself the last stage. (page 113)
It is an original event of perception in which we can learn to participate. (page 114)(about Goethe´s way of seeing)
No matter how beautiful, elegant, and harmonious the equations may be to the mathematical physicist, the fact remains that the variables in the equations represent quantities. Hence science today is concerned with only one aspect of the phenomena, and there are other aspects which cannot be reached in this way. Goethe´s way of science, by contrast, can be seen as the science of quality instead of quantity –but we need to have the corresponding experience to understand what this means. (page 115)
To be able to see these other aspects there would need to be a transformation of science itself. But this needs a transformation of the scientist, the result of such a transformation would be a radical change in our awareness of the relationship between nature and ourselves. Instead of mastery over nature, the scientist´s knowledge would become the synergy of humanity and nature. (page 115) (with holistic knowledge we could use a leverage to change the system???)
The historical value of Goethe´s work, in the wider sense, may be that he provides us with an instance of how this can be done. (page 115) (another instance would be art!!)
The growth of understanding more often comes from opposition than from agreement. (page 119)
We feel that our views, which seem to us so evidently true and complete, meet not with the acceptance we expect, but with disagreement, rejection, caution, or simply indifference. (page 119)
Taken in a more positive spirit, opposition to our views becomes the means of development whereby our understanding is enhanced, instead of, as it seems at first, threatened. (page 119) (so if diversity is good for knowledge, we have yet another reason to seek the knowledge children can contribute)
We are taken further by this opportunity in a direction which we would not have found ourselves, instead of being overcome by it. Or previous understanding, which we took at first to be the end of the story, is now seen as only a beginning, a stage on the way which is to be incorporated as part of a further, more comprehensive viewpoint. (page 119)
He realized that different Vortstellungsarten would result in the world being illuminated differently, and hence being disclosed in different modes. (page 120) (the German Word means ways of conceiving or seeing, then this different knowledge’s would indeed affect action and structure, i.e. the system)
He discovered that the foundations of science are historical instead of empirical, and hence that scientific knowledge is intrinsically historical instead of merely factual. (page 121)
What Goethe came to realize is that in science, as in art, truth is active and not passive, as the dogma of factualism implies. It is not the passive registration by an onlooker of what is there as such, independent of the scientist. The scientist is an active participant in scientific truth, but without this meaning that truth is thereby reduced to a merely subjective condition. (page 121)
The inner dynamic of the process of cognition is also an inner dynamic in the process of the self. What this means is that the “self-entity” itself emerges from the process of cognition and is not there as such beforehand. (page 123)
We are conscious at the level of the past and not the present, i.e., conscious at the level of finished perceptions and not of the process of their coming into being. So our ordinary thinking is “too late”: we are already the past of ourselves. (then what we need is a process that allows us to dwell in the cognitive process, to slow it down to be aware of it, art is very good for this!!) (page 124)
The first thing we can say is that there is a change in the organization as w ego from the visual experience of black and white blotches to seeing a giraffe. (page 127)
There is now a distinction between the marks, whereas before they were all equivalent. (page 127)
The giraffe is in the seeing –it is the seeing (we could say that we see “giraffely”). So the organization of the black and white blotches is in the seeing. But “organization” here must be thought of actively, i.e., as organizing, as an organizing act (an act which is organizing), and not as a state of organization, i.e., the condition of having been organized. (page 127-128) (again then I wonder if a different organization comes forth of a different way of seeing, is the poetry Project having a systemic change via micro level change of awareness??)
The answer is that it is an idea. It is an idea which organizes the sensory stimulus into seeing instead of just a visual appearance. (page 128)
The idea organizes because an idea is active –an idea is its activity, and this activity is organizing. Brentano said, “by ´idea’ I mean the act of conceiving, not that which is conceived”. (page 128)
We could paraphrase this directly, in terms of the discussion above, as “by ´organization’ we mean the act of organizing, not hat which is organized,” to which we should add that there is no separation within the act between the organizing act and that which is organized. (page 128)
The idea is the action. An entity cannot act, because an entity is already too late, being the stage of “solidification” which marks the end of activity. (page 128)
The difficulty which this presents to us is that where our thinking usually begins it is already too late. We have to go to the stage prior to our usual awareness, which has the effect of reversing the direction of our thinking so that we can recognize that we usually begin from what is, in fact, the end. (page 129)
To be conscious at the level of the organizing act would need a participant mode of consciousness instead of the onlooker mode. This would take us to a stage prior to our usual mode of consciousness. (page 129)
This is the error of thinking of the idea as a mental picture, as if it were a thought in our heads which we add on to the blotches, applying it to them externally as it were. This is the error of intellectualism. (page 129)
Equally, as mentioned before, the idea is not something we see through as if it were some kind of “mental transparency”. Here again, if we think this way, we miss the idea “in the act” and try to begin from the stage of the finished product, projecting this back in imagination to the earlier stage. (page 129)
We tend to think of an idea as a kind of mental entity, like a mental picture or image (the noun form predisposes us this way), whereas we should really think of an idea as the act of conceiving. (page 130)
We are accustomed to thinking of possibility as abstract and less real than actuality. But when we begin to understand what the concept (the organizing idea) is , then we realize that in this case “higher than actuality stands possibility”. (page 133)
But possibility cannot be derived from actualizations in this way. The attempt to do so gets it backwards: possibility is ultimately higher than actuality. Perhaps a better approach (though also ultimately inadequate) would be to think of possibility like a multivalent figure –like the duck/rabbit, or the reversing cube, but multivalent instead of bivalent. Such a figure has the advantage that each picture is wholly the figure, and not part of it, and yet no one picture exhausts the figure. (page 133)
The “organizing” of the organizing idea is an act of distinguishing which is simultaneously an act of relating. (page 135)
When we follow the coming-into-being of distinction in this way, we notice that distinguishing has the effect of relating. To mark out “something”, to give a boundary to “it” is thereby to relate it to that from which it is distinguished –i.e., to distinguish “something” is at the same time to distinguish what is “other” by virtue of that very distinction –and to which it is thereby related. (page 136)
The point here is that the relation is intrinsic to the act of distinguishing, and not an external connection between separate “somethings” which have already been distinguished. This means that the relation is a necessary relation, and not contingent, as it would be if it were an external connection. (page 136)
There is the one act of #distinguishing which is relating”, and not two separate acts: distinguishing and relating. This one act takes place in “opposite” directions simultaneously. (page 136)
However, we can experience the primary stage of distinguishing, before it becomes separating, by learning to free attention from what is seen, so that it shifts into the seeing activity itself. (page 137) (meaning focus on the seeing process, very much like reflexivity, like the consciousness required in the creation of art)
